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Abstract
This work illustrates potentials for recognition within ad hoc sen-
sor networks if their nodes possess individual inter-related biologically
inspired genetic codes. The work takes ideas from natural immune
systems protecting organisms from infection. Nodes in the present
proposal have individual gene sets fitting into a self organised phylo-
genetic tree. Members of this population are genetically ”relatives”.
Outsiders cannot easily copy or introduce a new node in the network
without going through a process of conception between two nodes in
the population. Related nodes can locally decide to check each other
for their genetic relation without directly revealing their gene sets.
A copy/clone of a gene sequence or a random gene set will appear as
alien. Nodes go through a cycle of introduction (conception or ”birth”)
with parents in the network and later exit from it (”death”). Hence
the phylogenetic tree is dynamic or possesses a genetic drift. Typical
lifetimes of gene sets and number of offspring from different parents
affect this genetic drift and the level of correlation between gene sets.
The frequency of mutations similarly affects the gene pool. Correlation
between genes of the nodes implies a common secret for cryptographic
material for communication and consistency check facilitating intrusion
detection and tracing of events. A node can by itself (non-specifically)
recognise an adversary if it does not respond properly according to
its genes. Nodes can also collaborate to recognise adversaries by com-
municating response from intruders to check for consistency with the
whole gene pool (phylogenetic tree).
1 Self-protecting networks and robustness
This work takes inspiration from natural immune systems to obtain self-
organised recognition and protection within ad hoc sensor networks [1]. The
assumed threat image here is introduction of false (hostile) nodes in a net-
work to monitor traffic and to corrupt the systems. Immune systems have
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for vertebrates both an innate (non-specific and static) and an adaptive part
which recognise special characteristics of pathogens. This protection system
include recognition of genetically self and non-self. [2; 3; 1] provide a re-
view of concepts for artificial immune systems to protect computer systems.
A reason for this development is the apparent weakness within traditional
computer security systems. Security concerns increasingly affect manage-
ment of computerised systems. A survey by FBI/CSI shows that 34 percent
of the respondent organisations spent more than 5 percent of their total IT
budget on IT-security in 2006 [4; 5]. One can therefore expect a variety of
approaches within this field.
Robustness is one of the fundamental characteristics of biological sys-
tems [6]. Kitano [7] defines robustness as a property that allows a system to
maintain its functions against internal and external perturbations. Stelling
et al. [8] similarly phrase that ”robustness, the ability to maintain perfor-
mance in the face of perturbations and uncertainty, is a long-recognised key
property of living systems”. Functionality within computer systems often
depends on security measures and their robustness. Observed fault toler-
ance of biological systems is a good reason to seek inspiration from biology
when considering security for complex and autonomous network systems
[9]. Complex computer systems typically result from a development driven
by empirical work where not anticipated problems are managed on an ad
hoc basis [10]. This tends to make computer systems similar to biologi-
cal systems which are complex and process information self-organised and
distributed.
Several authors have pointed out system similarities to biology to clarify
computer security issues. The well known concept ”computer virus” directly
refers to similarities between computers and biological systems [11; 12]. Li
and Knickerbockera [13] point out similarities between computer worms and
biological pathogens. They found that successful computer viruses typically
share common tactics as found for biological pathogens. Shafi and Abbass
[5]and Somaya [10] survey attempts to secure complex computer systems
by biologically-inspired adaptive systems and immunology. Ibrahim and
Maarof [14] also review biologically inspired approaches to cryptology.
It is common experience form biology that recognition is important for
protection. Examples are insect and cell communities. Social communities
and higher order animals also exercise protective recognition and individu-
alism. Computer systems may similarly obtain self-defense.
2 Illustration by simulation examples
2.1 Main purpose and result from present simulations
The following simulation examples illustrate generation of gene sets for nodes
in an assumed ad hoc stationary sensor network. These examples show that
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the correlation between the gene sets of different nodes for the present ap-
proach can stay within a range which is sufficient for the genes to serve
as distributed cryptographic material for the network. The generation and
distribution of cryptographic material here take place as a by-product of
uncorrelated interaction between couples of nodes. These contacts make for
example mutations to diffuse throughout and renew the gene pool. The
present examples are only meant for communicating ideas about potentials
for self-organised locally based protection. Caution must therefore be exer-
cised not to confuse these illustrations with quantitative analysis or design.
2.2 System initiation
Assume an ad hoc sensor network starts to increase from two nodes until
a fixed number of nodes (a stationary sensor network). This ”bootstrap”
process can take place via a protected channel (for example before physical
deployment). Fast establishment of network may also reduce possibilities
for attacks (reduce vulnerability) since there may be unlikely that a possi-
ble adversary maintains constant monitoring or readiness within the actual
area. An option to protect the network initiation is application of initial
cryptographic codes. Nodes which join the network during this initial pe-
riod, form genetic codes by receiving a mix of genetic codes from parents
within the network. Random ”mutations” enter this mix of genes.
2.3 Development of gene pool
The present results are form simulations of 100 and 1000 nodes in a network.
The authors made the simulation tool by direct programming in Ada 2005
(GNU Ada under Linux).
Each node in the simulations stores a data sequence similar to a gene in a
biological organism. An indexed set of variables GXi , i = 1, . . . , n represents
a gene sequence of a node X where n = 1000. For each i = 1, 2, . . . , n, the
”nucleotide” GXi has values in the range N def= {A,B, . . . , Z}. Two nodes X1
and X2 can make an offspring X3 via merging their genes so that GX3i = G
X1
i
and GX3i = G
X2
i with equal probability p = 0.48 and a probability pm = 0.04
for a random mutation GX3i ∈ N with uniform distribution.
A node enters the network via a random selection of two parents to
make an offspring as described above. The population of linked nodes in-
creases from two initial nodes (”parents”) up to the maximum of 100 nodes
(1000 nodes for the second simulation). A random node exits this popu-
lation (”dies”), when the number of nodes exceeds this number. It later
returns according to the procedure above. Table 1 shows an example of
gene sequences (the 70 first parts).
Figure 1 shows that for 100 nodes and only 10 possible parents, the
genetic diversity is significant larger than 50 percent (about 700 out of 1000
3
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Figure 1: Distribution of average pairwise number of equal gene elements
for simulations of 100 and 1000 nodes. The number of equal elements has a
binomial distribution. The left (blue) graph is for completely random genes.
Note that all the nodes within a population of 100 nodes have significantly
correlated genes. The simulation with 1000 nodes gives similar correlation
only for about 50 percent of the population of nodes. However, if only
10 percent of the nodes can be parents, the nodes are always significantly
correlated.
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Table 1: Example of gene sequences.
Node Gene sequence (with bases A..Z)
1 OBERJRDALRIWDABIPIAQATTLVBLMRSMAUSKVAAWFXJVVMVFERZTTUDEYMKMCKQSXLRBUHVQDWLFZAXRACYIFAKFXRNDDYFMQGSTY
2 CSEZMVWZLRMTDGBCPFASTRZMZVYMDVMADPKPAAUAXDVKMFVJEZEWSCNTXJICYSPDLXBTHEWPBJVWVXKDCSIFAMFXBOHMEZTQGTJR
3 OOERJVDAKRCWDAUIPFESTUILVBLMHEMAFPKZRAIFJQVVMVFZLSTTNUATMJICYUSXLRBUPVQPWBFWAXRECKIFAMFORODFYFKODSTY
4 IYZQQUTVKRIWEYLCECQUTUZYVYLZFLMQMOKTAYVMHJILMXVJDVRCUTXJSHWWYWVXQSRUHIKUXAKSPYGACEVDALUOEGRFIXKWFWMK
5 OYEQFRDALRTWEXBIPIZQAWSLKXIMRHMMUPGVAAWFXDKVMPNEQZTGUUXJMKMCMQSXWFBPHLQJJLFGAXRACYIFAIFXRRDDYFKUGTKY
6 CHNQRHAZYNMTDRWCPFASGUSYZVLMDJIQUPKIOCXAHDVNHFVAQZEBSULTCNICYUPNYVBTHEWPJJVAVXRRLIHFAIFXTOVDEZGUGYKR
7 JCEZYRWLPRENDCWOQIZGFUSXBYIURHMSUHGZGMQAWQOVZPSTCZRRQTYZXPPSAUPNWFDUHLLJVLFVAQLTCBIVEIFXBRLWARGORRKH
8 JKFRYVTFFRDEDCHIBIVJGBFFIVZMXKMAMOYHWAOAHDTWAFDJQDGGXTXZCRZCAWYXNXBWHHWCJAVKEURALANDENQOWKTJIZSSRRUA
9 HYAFWFHZPRKWEYBQEFEQRQIYLYLZXLMQUPYTSZVAHPKLDXFJQVRCXLMJSHIWYXVJQEBUMIKWQAKSIQBACIRDALAYEGLWIDKWVWOF
10 NXQHYVUOPROGEDFOQQOQGUGPKWRMDYUHUGXXAAVAHQTLMSVADZYYXPEJSHISMTFPWXBGCHRZIYXBVRLTCYAFANFMRRXGQFEGDMDN
corresponding gene elements are equal). This is due to ”inter-breeding”
between ancestors and descendants. The tendency of an upper tail for the
other similar distributions in Figure 1 has the same explanation.
Figure 2 shows a comparison between the distribution of equal gene ele-
ments in two simulations of populations of respectively 100 and 1000 nodes.
Any node can be parent in the 100 nodes population whereas only 10 percent
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Figure 2: Comparison of two populations with same number of potential
parents (100 and 1000 nodes).
of the nodes can be parent in the 1000 node population. Hence the num-
ber of parents are equal for these two populations(100 potential parents).
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Figure 2 illustrates that the set of parents defines the gene statistics. How-
ever, the extra offspring contribute to make many small variations (smooth
distribution).
Figure 3 shows the time development of the average number of equal
gene elements for the above simulations of 100 and 1000 nodes. It shows, as
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Figure 3: Time evolution of average number of equal gene elements. The
birth rate per node is constant (i.e. the time for a birth in a 100 node network
is 1/10 of the time in a 1000 node network). A birth process generates a
new gene sequence including 0.4 percent mutations. The ”memory factor”
(1 − 0.04)t = exp(µt), where µ = log 0.96, indicates the probability for a
gene element to survive up to time t.
expected, that this time development is equivalent for node populations with
the same number of possible parents. Figure 2 shows the distribution of the
number of equal nodes at the end of the simulation. Figure 3 also shows a
”memory factor” (1−0.04)t, where t is time. It indicates the probability for
a gene element to survive (i.e. to avoid mutation) after a number of births
given by the time parameter t.
2.4 Transfer of secret key
The following elaboration shows the potential for using correlation between
genes to code messages between nodes. Assume a node X transmits a gene
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(sub-)sequence to another node Y within a network as above. For each gene
element x = GXi which X transmits, there corresponds a statistically (posi-
tively) correlated element y = GYi in Y. Figure 1 indicates this correlation.
Each gene element has equal probability in this case. Assume X applies a
”code table” mapping gene elements g : N → N before transmission. The
receiving node Y can estimate this mapping which can serve as an encryption
key. The mapping g may be restricted to be a one-to-one (disambiguation)
mapping given by a permutation of the set N = {A,B,C, . . . , Z}. Note that
there are here 26! = 1 · 2 · 3 · . . . · 25 · 26 such possible permutations.
Table 2 shows an example of the conditional distribution of the received
code given the original code. The first line of Table 2 indicates that the
Table 2: Conditional distribution (percent) of gene element in receiving
node Y given corresponding gene element in the node X. Each row here
represents such a distribution.
A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
A 0 0 2 54 2 0 0 5 0 2 2 2 7 0 0 2 2 7 0 2 0 2 2 2 0 0
B 6 3 3 0 44 3 0 3 3 3 3 11 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 8
C 6 3 3 6 0 54 0 3 3 3 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 9 0 3 0 0
D 0 3 0 5 3 5 45 0 0 3 0 3 3 0 0 0 10 3 3 5 3 3 0 0 5 3
E 0 0 4 4 0 9 0 49 2 4 0 2 6 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 9 2 0 0 0 4
F 3 3 0 3 5 0 5 3 62 5 0 0 0 0 3 5 0 0 3 0 0 3 0 0 0 0
G 3 3 3 0 0 0 0 6 0 58 6 0 0 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 6 0 3 6 0 3
H 0 0 0 3 9 0 0 6 3 3 40 0 6 3 9 3 3 0 3 0 3 3 3 3 0 0
I 6 2 4 0 4 0 2 2 4 0 0 46 2 2 2 2 4 2 2 2 6 4 0 2 2 0
J 3 0 3 3 0 0 0 0 7 7 0 0 48 3 0 3 3 0 3 3 0 0 0 0 7 3
K 0 0 0 6 0 0 6 0 0 3 0 3 3 59 3 3 0 3 3 3 0 3 0 0 0 3
L 0 5 5 0 2 0 2 2 2 0 5 0 0 2 52 0 2 5 0 2 0 2 2 5 0 2
M 3 0 3 3 0 0 5 3 0 3 3 3 3 5 3 51 0 3 5 3 3 3 0 0 0 0
N 3 0 0 0 3 0 3 0 0 3 0 3 0 0 3 3 52 3 0 3 0 3 3 0 0 13
O 0 0 0 5 3 3 3 5 3 5 0 0 5 0 0 3 5 48 0 3 5 3 3 0 3 0
P 0 10 0 2 5 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 2 2 0 2 2 0 57 5 0 5 0 0 0 2
Q 2 2 7 7 2 0 2 0 0 0 5 7 0 0 2 5 0 5 2 42 5 0 5 0 0 0
R 2 0 5 5 0 2 2 5 5 2 0 0 2 0 0 5 2 5 2 0 44 2 0 0 0 7
S 6 3 0 6 3 3 3 3 0 3 3 0 3 0 3 6 6 0 0 3 3 40 0 0 3 3
T 0 3 3 3 0 0 6 0 0 3 0 3 0 3 3 0 0 0 0 3 9 3 53 0 0 6
U 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 5 0 0 0 5 0 3 0 3 0 3 3 3 0 0 59 5 10
V 3 0 0 6 3 0 0 6 0 0 0 3 3 3 0 0 0 3 3 0 3 3 0 0 62 0
W 4 0 2 0 0 2 6 0 2 4 0 4 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 4 2 0 4 2 56
X 53 0 6 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 12 0 3 3 3 0 9 3 0
Y 0 46 0 3 0 8 3 3 5 0 5 0 3 0 3 8 0 3 3 3 0 3 0 3 0 3
Z 0 0 57 0 0 0 0 0 3 6 0 0 3 3 3 6 0 3 0 0 9 9 0 0 0 0
code table (function) maps A to D (g : A → D). The second line similarly
indicates gB → E). The three bottom lines indicate g : X → A, g : Y → B
and g : Z→ C.
Let X and Y denote any two nodes. Note that for i 6= j any two
different gene elements, GXi and G
Y
j are statistically uncorrelated. Assume
that the mapping Φ : {1, 2, . . . , n} → {1, 2, . . . , n} defines a permutation of
the set of integers 1, 2, . . . , n. I.e. (Φ(1),Φ(2), . . . ,Φ(n)) is a permutation
of (1, 2, . . . , n). Assume the node X transmits the gene elements xi = GXi ,
i = 1, 2, . . . , n to the node Y after translating then through the code table
(mapping) g as described above. Assume X also permutes the order of
elements before transmitting it to node Y translated by a code table (or
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function) g. I.e. Y receives the gene codes yi = g(GXφ(i)), i = 1, 2, . . . , n. Y
holds the potential to recognise both the permutation φ and the code table g
due to its genetic relation (code sequence correlation) with X. The following
outline shows this potential. Consider Table 2. Each row represents an
estimate p(y | x) of the conditional probability distribution of a translated
gene element y = GYi ∈ N in the node Y given the corresponding element
x = GXi ∈ N in the node X(note: N = {A,B,C, . . . , Z}). Let p(y | x)
represent the element given by the row x ∈ N and column y ∈ N of Table
2. The permutation φ tend to minimise the entropy measure Hφ:
H(Y | Xφ) = −
n∑
i=1
p(yi | xφ(i)) log p(yi | xφ(i)) (1)
It similarly maximises the mutual information:
I(Xφ;Y ) =
∑
xφ(i),yi
p(xφ(i), yi) log
p(xφ(i), yi)
p(xφ(i))p(yi)
(2)
Hence, Y may sort out likely candidates for the original permutation φ
decided by the node X. Application of Equations 1 and 2 can significantly
save computational cost. The unconditional distribution of the value of a
gene elementGXi is for example constant p(x) = 1/M whereM is the number
of possible values of a gene element (M = 26 for the present example).
Table 2 demonstrates a possible computational simplification. The actual
permutation φ is the one that gives (only) one value significant larger than
the others along each row. The resulting ”minimum entropy table” then
gives the code table g.
Restriction of possible permutations and code tables also reduces poten-
tial computational cost. However, it increases the leakage of information to
the environment. Hash values from the node X may help Y finally to find
the actual permutation among a limited number of likely candidates.
2.5 Recognition as password cracking
Assume two nodes X and Y share some ancestors (are relatives) and that
corresponding gene elements are equal with probability p = 1/3 as compared
to a not relative where the probability of equal gene element would be p =
1/26 (note that a gene element can have 26 possible values). Assume X asks
Y to guess the value of a number of its (X’s) gene elements (for example
the n first gene elements of X). One may look at this situation as if Y has
to guess a password (or a set of possible passwords). X may recognise Y
as ”relative” if it is clever to guess requested passwords (either measured
by response time or by ratio of success assuming X gives Y several fake
alternative hash values for the passwords so a non-relative will more often
guess wrong password as compared to a relative).
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One may intuitively believe that a probability of p = 1/3 to guess cor-
rectly each character in a password, does not help much to guess a pass-
word of many characters. The examples below may help perception. As-
sume, for simplicity, that passwords are only two characters long. This
gives a search space consisting of 26 × 26 = 676 possible combinations of
characters in the range A,B,. . . ,Z (26 possible letters). Assume the two
first gene elements of Y are ’AA’ (i.e. GY1 = G
Y
2 = A). This means that
P (GX1 = A | GY1 = A) = 1/3 and P (GX1 = S | GY1 = A) = 2/3×1/25 = 2/75
for any value of S different from A.
Table 3 shows that Y may utilise information in its genes to significantly
restrict the search space for the correct password to find it with probability
larger than 50 percent. The whole search space consists of 676 elements
Table 3: Probabilities for the first two gene elements of X given that the
corresponding gene elements of Y is ’AA’ (i.e. GY1 = G
Y
2 = A). p = 1/3 is
the (conditional) probability for the first and second gene element of X to
be A (independently). q = 2/75 is the probability any other value of these
gene elements. Left column and upper row respectively annotate values of
first and second gene elements. Combinations of p and q are products. pp =
(1/3)2, pq = 1/3×2/75 and qq = 2/75×2/75. The sum of the products given
by the union of the row and the column A (bold letters) is 0.56. This part of
the search space thus has probability more than 0.5. Note that the table can
be looked at as a result from the matrix operation [p, q, q, . . . , q]t[p, q, q, . . . , q]
between two vectors giving the (conditional) probability for each character
A,B,...,Z.
A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
A pp pq pq pq pq pq pq pq pq pq pq pq pq pq pq pq pq pq pq pq pq pq pq pq pq pq
B qp qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq
C qp qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq
D qp qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq
E qp qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq
F qp qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq
G qp qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq
H qp qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq
I qp qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq
J qp qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq
K qp qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq
L qp qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq
M qp qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq
N qp qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq
O qp qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq
P qp qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq
Q qp qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq
R qp qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq
S qp qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq
T qp qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq
U qp qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq
V qp qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq
W qp qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq
X qp qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq
Y qp qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq
Z qp qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq
(possible combinations). Hence an outsider (non relative) has to search
through 338 combinations to find the combinations with 50 percent prob-
ability. However, Y may restrict its search to the 51 combinations with
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highest probability (row and column A). Denote such a search space as a
”50 percent probability search space”. A significant intuition here is that
the cardinality of the 50 percent conditional probability search space scales
with dimensions below the similar space for unconditional probabilities (or
less restricted conditions).
An identification procedure may include several such tests and an out-
sider may loose the game of guessing passwords by processing too slow or via
giving wrong answer too frequent (provided he is given several alternative
hash values for the search).
The following example generalises the one above. Assume now that X
asks Y to guess the value of 10 of its (X’s) gene elements (for example the
10 first gene elements of X). The node X may deliver to Y a hash value of
these gene elements so Y can check if it guesses it correct (or alternatively
give a set of possible hash values so Y may risk to give wrong answer). The
sequence of these 10 gene elements forms a key (or ”password”) which Y
is asked to resolve (”crack”). The task of Y is similar to crack a realistic
password given a (Unix) password file. Node Y can reply to node X with
another hash value.
The knowledge that p = 1/3 gives the node Y also here the oppor-
tunity to define a probability measure on the set of all possible keys (or
”passwords”). Let k denote the number of equal gene elements in the cor-
responding sequence of gene elements of the nodes X and Y (0 ≤ k ≤ 10).
k has the following (binomial) probability mass distribution:
f(k;n, p) =
(
n
k
)
pk(1− p)n−k (3)
where n = 10 and p is the probability of pair-wise equal gene element.
Figure 4 shows the distribution of number of Pair-wise equal elements for
p = 1/26, 1/3, 1/2.
Note that in the case of p = 1/26 (not relatives) the probability P (C)
for any random combination C of gene elements is
P (C) =
(n
k
)
pk(1− p)n−k(n
k
)
25n−k
=
1
26n
(4)
This means (as expected) that all combinations have the same probability
for being the correct key (”password”) for not related nodes. Hence, for p =
1/26, in order to find the correct key with more than 50 percent probability,
Y must test 2610/2 combinations of gene element values.
Figure 4 shows that for p = 1/3 (relative), more than half of the prob-
ability mass is for k = 3, 4, 5. Equation 5 gives the general formula for the
total number of combinations Nk for a given number k of matching elements.
Nk =
(
n
k
)
(I − 1)n−k (5)
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Figure 4: Probability of equal corresponding gene elements.
I is number of possible values for each gene element (in this case I = 26).
This gives that the total number of tests (for k = 3, 4, 5 and p = 1/26) is(n
3
)
257+
(n
4
)
256+
(n
5
)
255. Hence a non-relative has to process (test) in average
about 1000 times more different keys (combinations) as compared to a rela-
tive to find the correct key with a probability larger than 50 percent. This
difference (ratio) increases with increased value of p (for relative), increased
number of possible gene elements and increased key length. The ratio is
for example more than a million for I = 1024(and n = 10 and p = 1/3 as
above).
3 Discussion
The present approach can be redundant and complementary to centrally
organised trusted components such as for Public Key Infrastructure [15].
Centrally organised and designed security systems typically lack robustness,
distributability and autonomy. They require correct implementation and
management [16]. Hence one seeks alternatives for systems to operate in
hostile or uncontrolled environments of for example users not caring for
security.
Section 2 illustrates by examples the potential to improve security in
sensor networks where the nodes possess interrelated individual ”genetic”
codes with a restricted lifetime. These examples are only meant to commu-
nicate ideas and to show potentials for control/regulation of statistical cor-
relation between gene codes. The nodes in these examples carry a dynamic
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(time changing) ”gene pool” which can be looked at as a distributed com-
mon secret for recognition and protection of communication. This method
of ”genetic protection” has similarities to application of threshold cryptog-
raphy where nodes share a cryptographic secret without each storing the
entire information of it [17]. The present simulation examples show pro-
tection without direct adaptation to specific adversaries (”patogens”). The
protection method is in this way similar to innate (static) immune systems.
However, assume an adversary manage to obtain genetic information from
the gene pool and to use it for intrusion. If it fails to fit into the phylogenetic
three of the gene pool, or it appears as a clone of a member of the network,
then the network may regenerate the part of the gene pool which makes
the intruder able to enter the network. This gives adaptation to specific
intruders (cf the concept of ”adaptive immune systems”).
Genetic protection also has similarities to application of chaos cryptog-
raphy [18; 19] where nodes obtain common secrets via a synchronisation
process and which they can use to protect communication. A node must
participate in the synchronisation to obtain the common secret (encryption
key) which is time varying. A significant difference here (from the present
approach) is that application of chaos synchronisation requires frequent com-
munication/updates.
Note that both chaos cryptography and numerically based cryptography
[20] over public channels imply active participation in a communication for
a node to obtain cryptographic material. The examples above are similar
in this way. A node which is passive long enough, will fall outside the
communication.
The present ideas have the justification from potential advantages in
given situations. These situations can be defined by for example low com-
munication bandwidth, periods with unidirectional communication and at-
tacks on centralised security systems. Risk for loss of data is often a special
issue for sensor networks. Nodes in sensor networks may store valuable data
and redundant security systems may help to secure these before a possibly
expendable sensor system halts. Sensor systems typically collect data which
are available in the environment. Hence protection of these data from being
available for outsiders may have little meaning. Protection of functionality
may therefore be a main focus for security within sensor networks.
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